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The Pacto de 
Sangre in the Late 
Nineteenth-Century 
Nationalist 
Emplotment of 
Philippine History
The Pacto de Sangre (Blood Compact), despite its crucial significance 
in Filipino conceptions of history, is seldom interrogated in Philippine 
historiography. The event that happened in Bohol in 1565, involving 
Sikatuna and Legazpi, was narrativized in the late nineteenth century and 
became integral to the nationalist emplotment of the past. However, the 
two principal narrative strands of Marcelo del Pilar and Andres Bonifacio 
differed owing to divergent political projects. This article revisits the 
making of a founding myth of Filipino nationhood in light of scholarship on 
ancient blood oaths and the historical account of the encounter of Sikatuna 
and Legazpi.
Keywords: historiography • blood oath • blood brotherhood • nationalism • 
myth maKing
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I
n his classic The Propaganda Movement: 1880–1895, Fr. John N. 
Schumacher, S.J., points out that the Pacto de Sangre—traditionally 
rendered in English as the Blood Compact—was one of the “princi-
pal points emphasized” in the historical writings of the ilustrados, the 
well-educated early Filipino nationalists (Schumacher 1973, 206; 
1997, 228). The Pacto de Sangre, he points out, was based on the “custom 
among the ancient Filipinos of sealing a treaty of alliance and friendship by 
mixing the blood taken from an incision in the arms of the two leaders enter-
ing into alliance” in an alcoholic drink that both leaders drank (ibid.). Schu-
macher (1973, 134n; 1997, 150n) observes that the blood oath of “Legazpi 
and Sicatuna . . . [was a] token of friendship and allegiance” between a 
conquistador and a chief who was “undoubtedly merely a local datu” but the 
ilustrados “liked to look on this pact . . . as the agreement between equals on 
which Spain’s rights in the Philippines were based.”1
Schumacher (1973, 206; 1997, 228) writes further, “Paterno, Rizal, 
Del Pilar, presented the pact as a contractual agreement between equals, 
by which the Filipinos had sworn loyalty to the king of Spain and simul-
taneously had become Spaniards in the full sense of the word.” For their 
part the Spaniards had to do their part in “assimilating” the Filipinos. How-
ever, “inasmuch as the Spaniards had violated their side of the contract,” 
the Pacto de Sangre was used to “signify the right of Filipinos to withdraw 
from the pact their ancestor had entered into” (ibid. 1973, 207; 1997, 229). 
Schumacher (1973, 207; 1997, 229–30) emphasizes that this understanding 
of Spain’s failure to abide by the agreement “between King Sikatuna and 
Legazpi” justified the position that “Filipinos are no longer bound by the 
pacto de sangre, and not subject to Spanish sovereignty”—concluding that 
“This, in fact, Andrés Bonifacio would do in 1896 to start the Revolution 
through the Katipunan.”
Laying out these ideas in 1973, Schumacher has provided a clear exposi-
tion of the meanings that ilustrados such as Marcelo del Pilar attached to the 
encounter of Sikatuna and Legazpi. Concomitantly Schumacher suggests 
that the ilustrados “liked to look on this pact” in a way that was inadmissible. 
Cesar Adib Majul (1967, 78) raised a similar point, saying that “The assertion 
that the Philippines came under Spanish sovereignty on account of a com-
pact, if meant to refer to historical fact, is inaccurate” simply because “there 
was no such nation as the Philippines during the time the blood compact 
took place.” Majul (ibid.) also asserted that “Sikatuna was a local chief, and 
there is no evidence that he negotiated for the whole Archipelago.” Along 
with Majul, Schumacher is one of the very few historians who have queried 
how the Pacto de Sangre has been regarded in Philippine historiography. 
These commentaries, however, have not altered the general conception of 
this event.
The Pacto de Sangre in Philippine History
In school and college textbooks, the treatment of the Blood Compact has 
been highly variable. Whether ignored, mentioned perfunctorily, or dis-
cussed at length, the Pacto de Sangre has lived on in the national imagina-
tion, underwritten by a grand narrative. 
Interestingly, in the second half of the twentieth century, historians 
seemed to awaken to its importance by giving the Blood Compact a treat-
ment more extended than in their earlier works. For example, Gregorio Zaide 
(1958, 39), in History of the Filipino People, wrote simply, “At Limasawa, he 
[Legazpi] was well received by Bankaw, king of the island. At Bohol, he 
made a blood compact with two Filipino kings of the island—Sikatuna and 
Sigala.” In The Pageant of Philippine History, Zaide (1979, 227–35) gave a 
longer account, detailing the background of Legazpi and Urdaneta, describ-
ing the voyage, and explaining the context of the Blood Compact, even men-
tioning the village where it was supposed to have transpired.2 For his part 
Teodoro Agoncillo (1974), in Introduction to Filipino History, mentioned 
nothing but the scarcity of food supplies in Bohol.3 His example would be 
followed by Renato Constantino (1975), Jaime Veneracion (1987), and O. D. 
Corpuz (1989), who chose to be reticent about the Pacto de Sangre. In His-
tory of the Filipino People Agoncillo (1990, 74) thought it worth a quick 
mention: “By February 1565, Legazpi reached Cebu and contracted blood 
compacts with Si Katunaw and Si Gala at Bohol.” 
The writers of Tadhana mentioned the sandugo (literally, unified blood) 
ceremony of Legazpi with Sikatuna and Sigala, as well as that of Kolambu 
and Magellan, but chose to emphasize the rite that transpired between Tupas 
and Legazpi in Cebu, explaining
Now, in the solemn ritual, native and foreigner would consecrate the 
friendship that eluded earlier efforts. But, though blood had blended, 
minds remained apart. To the Filipino, the blood compact was an agree-
ment between equals, a pledge of eternal fraternity and alliance. In 
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the same instant that Tupas and Legazpi now drained their cups, it 
was clear on the other hand that to the Spaniard this was a ceremony 
between victor and vanquished foe. . . . (Marcos 1976, 45)
This interpretation has been endorsed by Zeus Salazar (2009).4
Fr. José Arcilla, S.J. (1984, 14–15), made no mention of the blood cer-
emony in An Introduction to Philippine History, a work that first appeared in 
1971. In Rizal and the Emergence of the Philippine Nation, Arcilla (1991) 
began to mention the Blood Compact,5 his discussion becoming florid in the 
book’s 2003 edition, which provided the context of Legazpi’s expedition and 
the circumstances that led to the meeting with Sikatuna, culminating in
Legazpi’s request . . . to invite a chief in Bohol, Si Katuna (or Katunao), 
to come on board and hold a parley with Legazpi. After some hesi-
tation, the chief showed willingness to come, provided ransom was 
exchanged between the two parties. The traditional rite of kasing-
kasing was duly performed with Katuna’s son and the day after, Katuna 
himself came aboard to repeat the same ceremony. They collected a 
few drops of blood from their arms, mixed them with wine, and drank 
the mixture. In their native tradition, since the same blood now flowed 
in their veins, they had become members of the same family, bound to 
observe loyalty to one another. Finally, in the king’s name on 15 April, 
Legazpi took possession of the island of Bohol. With nothing more to do 
in Bohol, Legazpi decided to proceed to Cebu. (Arcilla 2003, 36–37) 
Other historical texts that appeared in the last decade of the twentieth 
century gave the Blood Compact more than a passing mention. Rosario 
Mendoza Cortes and colleagues (2000, 30) in The Filipino Saga: History as 
Social Change wrote, “Miguel Lopez de Legazpi arrived in Cebu, ruled by 
Rajah Tupas, on 27 April 1565. Earlier, he had landed in Bohol, where he 
befriended two native chiefs, Sikatuna and Sigala, with whom he performed 
blood compacts, first with Sikatuna on 16 March 1565 and, a few days later, 
with Sigala.” In a piece that appeared on the front page of the Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, Ambeth Ocampo (1999, 11) explained the Blood Compact 
within the frame of modern diplomacy: It was as a “treaty of peace” needed 
because “the Spaniards . . . were not allowed to land on Bohol.” The resulting 
“blood compact or sandugo between Sikatuna and Legaspi,” Ocampo (ibid., 
1) stressed, “can be seen not only as the first bond of friendship between the 
Philippines and Spain, but also the first international treaty between the 
Philippines and a foreign country” (ibid.). This “treaty” was entered into at 
“a time when the Spaniards went into agreements with Filipino leaders, a 
time in the distant past when the colonizers treated Filipino leaders as equals 
rather than slaves” (ibid., 11).6
In 2003, as part of the official commemoration of Philippine-Spanish 
Friendship Day, Virgilio Almario (2003) put out a book titled Pacto de Sangre: 
Spanish Legacy in Filipinas, which gives the blood oath a transcendental 
significance that verges on a postnationalist reading. As Almario (ibid., 2) 
contends, merging the historic event with the book of the same title, “Pacto 
de Sangre is symbolic of the cultural transfusion which transpired after Sika-
tuna drank the wine mixed with Legazpi’s blood,” but admits that, although 
the “Spanish blood [is] in our veins,” “The transfusion, perhaps, is largely 
one-side.” In any case, by drinking Legazpi’s blood, Sikatuna wedded Filipi-
nos to Spanish culture and civilization. For many it has been a literal transfu-
sion: “Spanish blood now runs through the veins of many Filipinos and has 
become part of the Filipino genetic stock” (ibid.).
For all the variable treatment of this event in various history texts, the 
Pacto de Sangre appears to have become increasingly romanticized as the 
Spanish colonial past recedes and as various strands of Filipino nationalism 
mature, particularly in the wake of the centenary of the Filipinos’ revolu-
tion against Spain. Undoubtedly the Blood Compact is deeply etched in the 
national consciousness. To many Filipinos there is a sense of Sikatuna stand-
ing tall in the face of the conquistador Legazpi, the latter compelled to abide 
by the indigenous custom as a way of “insuring friendly relations.” From this 
Bohol chief is named the Order of Sikatuna, “the national order of diplomat-
ic merit” instituted by Pres. Elpidio Quirino on 27 February 1953, through 
Executive Order 571, to celebrate “the first treaty (Pacto de Sangre) between 
the Philippines and a foreign country” (Wikipedia 2009; ICON Group 2008). 
As the official marker on the presumed site also declares: “Thus during this 
period of colonization, a bond was sealed in accordance with native practice, 
the first treaty of friendship and alliance between Spaniards and Filipinos.” 
This event can be regarded as a defining moment—a founding myth—of 
Filipino nationhood. The event is memorialized in Napoleon Abueva’s 1997 
bronze sculpture of Sikatuna and Legazpi located along a shoreline of Bohol 
Island—called the Blood Compact Shrine7—that Filipino travelers visit in a 
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sort of pilgrimage to a holy ground of history and a touristy bow to the past. 
The Internet offers an abundant collection of photographs of this tableau 
(fig. 1) and of tourists posing with the monument in the background.
Given the salience of this event in Philippine historiography, this article 
revisits the Sikatuna-Legazpi encounter to probe deeper into the appropria-
tion of this event in the context of the rise of Filipino nationalist conscious-
ness in the late nineteenth century. Its meanings at present may be somewhat 
different from how it was apprehended in the late nineteenth century, but 
without its appropriation in that earlier period it can be argued that the Pacto 
de Sangre would not have resonated throughout the twentieth century and 
into the twenty-first. To reexamine the late nineteenth century appropria-
tion of the Pacto de Sangre, this article focuses primarily on the writings of 
Marcelo del Pilar and Andres Bonifacio, who interpreted it in rather different 
ways.8 Also discussed is Juan Luna’s painting of this event. This article can be 
seen as a retracing of Fr. John N. Schumacher’s discussion and an amplifi-
cation of his provocative suggestion concerning the ilustrados’ skewed per-
ception, but this is done in the context of what we now understand as the 
dynamics of precolonial societies, bringing into stark relief the divergence 
of the nationalist appropriation of this event from what is known about the 
preconquest practice of making blood oaths.
The Ancient Blood Oaths
In the age prior to the European conquest, the peoples that lived on the 
islands that would later be known as the Philippines held lavish feasts to build 
and cement alliances among rulers or chiefs and their followers. The forging 
of an alliance in the context of preventing bloodshed or ending a feud or 
warfare involved a ceremony in which drops of blood from the persons enter-
ing into this relationship were mixed in an alcoholic drink, which they then 
drank. Laura Lee Junker (2000, 301) prefers to call this ritual a blood oath.
Given the absence of indigenous sources, the only sources concerning this 
manner of building alliances come from Spanish chroniclers in the sixteenth 
century. Thus our knowledge of it is mediated, and perhaps compromised, by 
the challenges of intercultural communication. At the same time, Filipinos 
have also been heavily influenced by the perspectives of the late nineteenth 
century in viewing blood swearing events. Still it is worth looking at some of 
these early accounts, to which regrettably I have access only in their English 
translation. Miguel de Loarca (1582/1975, 98) is said to have reported:
Reconciliation between those who have quarreled, whether these 
are individuals or the people of different villages, is brought about 
by drawing blood from the arms of both parties, and each tasting the 
blood of the other, placed in a shell, sometimes mixed with a little 
wine; and such friendship is not to be broken.
The Boxer’s Codex (Anon. 1975, 233) puts it thus: 
When they make friends with those whom they are at war or with 
others, some are accustomed to take a little blood from the arms or 
other part of the body and give it to drink to those who wish to become 
their friends and the others do likewise and in this way they say peace 
and friendship are made perfectly and that it would not break.
Taken at their face value, these renditions suggested that a key principle 
in the Spanish accounts was their understanding of these oaths as a means 
to establish “friendship” to prevent or terminate a bloody dispute between 
Fig. 1. Napoleon Abueva’s Blood Compact, 1997
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individuals presumably within one village or across two villages. The cir-
cumstances that brought individuals or entire villages to decide to become 
friends after a period of enmity were not stated. But once the parties—their 
numbers were not specified—had decided to become friends instead of ene-
mies, they would “taste” or partake of each other’s blood, sealing a relation-
ship that was not to be broken.
Distilling sources on the Visayas, William Henry Scott (1994, 156) sug-
gests the following about blood oaths:
Hostilities were suspended or avoided by sandugo: peace pacts in 
which the two parties drank a few drops of one another’s blood in a 
draught of wine. . . . It was a procedure by which two men, not nec-
essarily enemies, became blood brothers, vowing to stick together 
through thick and thin, war and peace, and to observe mourning 
restriction whenever they were separated from one another.
Perhaps in response to how blood oaths have been interpreted since the rise 
of Filipino nationalism, Scott (ibid.) clarifies that “These peace pacts were 
made between two datus, however, not between two nations or tribes, and 
so were binding on other members of the community only to the extent of 
the pact holder’s effective authority, and in no case on other datus.” Scott 
underscores the “localized” character of blood oaths. However, he informs 
us that the parties to such a pact need not have been enemies, but the ex-
pectation was similar whether or not there had been prior animosity: a bond 
that would survive through “war and peace.” Scott raises this ritually sealed 
friendship to the level of blood brotherhood.
Some light is thrown on this ancient practice by Thomas Kiefer’s (1968) 
study of ritual friendship among the Tausug in the late 1960s. The parties to 
a ritually solidified friendship became “brothers” by swearing on the Koran, 
a practice that could have replaced the drawing of blood and its joint partak-
ing. Nevertheless, the basic contours of the Tausug practice appear to be very 
similar to what is known about the ancient blood oaths. Harkening to Scott’s 
portrait, Kiefer (ibid., 228) reports that Tausug who entered ritual brotherhood 
could either be casual friends who wanted “to cement their relationship with 
supernatural sanctions . . . to prevent betrayal and to increase the solidarity of 
the bond”; or they could be former enemies who agree to “finalize an ami-
cable settlement between them” through someone’s intermediation. The 
relationship forged in this ritual is supposed to be “permanent and inten-
sive—an extension of those found within the family” (ibid.). Breaking the oath 
would invite a terrible curse that could be passed on to many generations.
Note that the parties in a blood oath could not be too far apart in terms 
of status position (ibid., 234). Kiefer also reports that “two headmen from 
adjacent or distant communities [could] swear together” and thus unite both 
communities in a large alliance (ibid.). However, oath taking is “basically 
dyadic. When a large group swears together it is not the entire group which 
is thought to be solidary, but only each of the various dyads within it” (ibid., 
233). Given the prevalence of dyadic ties in Philippine society at present, 
it could well have been the situation in the precolonial age—which would 
have made the blood oaths involving two relatively large social groups not 
only localized but also reducible to a series of dyads of sworn brothers.
However, as Kiefer suggests, in a bond of former enemies there was 
“often some ambivalence in the relationship, which may come to the sur-
face with any precipitating event” (ibid., 230). At the moment of swearing 
brotherhood, the strong motivation apparently was to have an ally in war, just 
as two men from distant villages would want to become sworn brothers for 
purposes of battle or a piracy expedition (ibid., 233). In a highly fluid social 
world such as that of the Tausug in the 1960s or the preconquest islands with 
their internecine warfare, one needed allies. The ancient blood oath was 
most likely a strategy of negotiating one’s way through the thickets of conflict 
and warfare, to ensure that one had a friend who would fight alongside him 
against an enemy. This norm drew from the ideal solidarity of siblingship, 
a paramount relationship among peoples that practiced cognatic kinship in 
this part of the world.
It can be argued, therefore, that the ancient blood oath was a mechanism 
to create by means of ritual a bond analogous to that of siblings. Siblinghood 
was the ideal norm because siblings were believed to share a common blood 
substance and were reared to value unity and mutual assistance in various 
aspects of life, including warfare. Because blood was seen as the essence of 
life unique to individuals, persons created a solid tie by drinking each other’s 
blood after which they possessed in common the same essence of life. After 
the oath, their blood was seen to contain the blood of the other, thus forming 
a unity. If drinking milk from the breasts of the same woman could create 
siblingship (and human milk itself is said to be produced from blood circu-
lating in the body), as Carsten (1995, 227–28) has shown for another part of 
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Southeast Asia, it is not farfetched that in the ancient blood oath the direct 
partaking of blood could create a bond of siblinghood that was foundational. 
Siblinghood as the model of blood oaths was also important because, amid sib-
ling unity, hierarchy according to birth order existed. Allies who became blood 
brothers were not necessarily equal, as a chief could enter into a blood oath 
and become the vassal of a stronger chief in forming an alliance network.
Yet loyalty was not fully guaranteed and betrayal of a blood brother could 
happen, if for instance one party sided with a kinsman who had become 
the enemy of a ritual friend. After all siblings, even today, do have conflicts 
that tarnish the ideal, despite the fact that siblings strenuously avoid such an 
eventuality. Notwithstanding the possibility of betrayal, we may conclude 
that the blood ceremony was a ritual of sworn siblinghood, which was meant 
to create an indissoluble friendship, a dyadic bond that was part of a larger 
concatenation of dyads that formed an alliance network.
Viewing the blood oath in terms of sworn or blood brotherhood enables 
us to see that the blood oath of the ancient islanders in what would become 
the Philippines was akin to cultural practices found in many other societies 
around the world. For instance, “in the old Irish Sagas, there are traces of the 
old Scandinavian custom borrowed from the Vikings, of two men mingling 
their blood and becoming sworn brothers” (Hodges 1922, 385n). On the 
western islands of Scotland “the ancient islanders has ratified their leagues 
of friendship ‘by drinking a drop of each other’s blood’” (ibid., 390). Hodges 
(ibid., 389–90) argued in the 1920s that
It is now a well-established fact that covenanting by some use of the 
blood of the covenanters, the custom known as blood-brotherhood, 
has been practiced in nearly all parts of the world. Scores of exam-
ples are recorded, showing that blood-brotherhood has been known 
throughout the centuries, from hundreds of years before Christ among 
the early Scythians down to our own day among savage tribes. And 
the practice is found in such widely scattered regions as America, 
Australia, Africa, Europe, and Asia.9
In the 1910s a scholar had noted 
“the notion that particularly by drinking the blood of another living 
being a man absorbs the nature or life into his own, one which appears 
among primitive peoples in many forms”. . . . “But the most notable 
application of the idea is in the rite of blood brotherhood, examples 
of which are found all over the world. In the simplest form of this 
rite, two men become brothers by opening their veins and sucking one 
another’s blood. Thenceforth their lives are not two but one.” (Heather 
1952, 158)
In Africa in the nineteenth century blood brotherhood was fairly com-
mon, especially in the Kenyan coastal region, as a mechanism by which 
travelers and traders of different ethnicities formed business networks that 
allowed strangers to be trusted and assured the safety of merchants (Herlehy 
1984, 298). It was such a useful alliance that “even some of the early Euro-
pean travelers and colonial administrators had to become blood-brothers 
with local residents before they could expect an hospitable reception by host 
communities” (ibid., 299). The parties rubbed a piece of roasted chicken 
or goat on a cut made in one’s chest “so that the meat mixes with their 
own blood”; they then exchanged and ate the meat while declaring a vow of 
brotherhood (ibid.).
Were the Spanish conquistadors familiar with the blood oaths practiced 
in ancient Europe and in other parts of the world? Whatever the case might 
have been, it is interesting that, in the early Spanish accounts, the blood oath 
was not described in a disparaging manner. Certainly it was not condemned 
as a heathen practice. On the contrary, the conquistadors participated in 
blood oaths, much as Europeans participated in blood oaths in Kenya in the 
nineteenth century. Based on what can be deduced about the past, despite 
the linguistic divide, Spanish conquistadors entered into blood pacts with 
the islanders with some understanding of what the ceremony meant and 
evidently without any squeamishness. Their understanding must have been 
more than superficial. Because they figured that chiefs had circumscribed 
authority and they wanted to position themselves strategically in local alli-
ance networks, as Scott (1994, 156) acutely observes, “Spanish command-
ers usually drew blood with more than one chief when making treaties [of 
friendship]—Magellan in Cebu, Saavedra in Sarangani, Legazpi in Samar, 
Goiti in Leyte, Rodríguez in Negros.” Scott (ibid.) notes the irony “that the 
blood compact between Legazpi and Si Katuna of Bohol memorialized in 
Juan Luna’s famous 1883 El Pacto de Sangre was an exception to this prac-
tice of drawing blood with more than one chief.”
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The Blood Oath of Legazpi and Sikatuna
One account of this event indicates that, when Legazpi’s forces landed in 
Bohol in mid-March 1565, they were in dire need of provisions and their 
flagship needed major repairs. Initially Legazpi wondered why the island-
ers did not approach them to trade, so he sent “the Moro,” a cooperative 
captive, to seek out Sikatuna, who could be found “near a river two leagues 
away” from where they had anchored, with assurances that Legazpi’s forces 
meant no harm (Anon. [1990], 191). The following day the Moro returned 
with word that Sikatuna was skeptical because of the “trickery and injury 
that the Portuguese and the Moluccans had inflicted on them” a couple 
of years earlier (ibid.). Sikatuna reportedly made it a condition that, for the 
islanders to be “reassured,” a Spaniard should meet him where he was “and 
make a blood compact with him” (ibid.). Legazpi then sent a soldier named 
Santiago, together with the Moro, to meet Sikatuna, who then gave them a 
warm reception: “He gave him food and told him to make a blood compact 
and sealed their friendship. Both drank the blood mixed with wine” (ibid.). 
With some level of trust established, Sikatuna promised he would go and see 
Legazpi another day.
Sikatuna did go to the coast where Legazpi’s ships had anchored but 
would not board the ships. He wanted Legazpi to meet him on shore but 
he must be “alone to make a blood compact with him and make the natives 
feel safe with the Spaniards” (ibid.). Legazpi demurred, explaining through 
the Moro interpreter that “even if he wanted to go, his people would not let 
him; because someone like him, serving a prince so great and as powerful 
as the King of Castilla, was not to go alone anywhere” (ibid., 192). Legazpi, 
of course, was being cautious, because he had experienced previously in 
Cibabao (Leyte) Island one of his men killed while in the act of making 
the blood ceremony (Legazpi 1903, 201). With assurances of safety and two 
men from the Spanish armada as escorts along with several of his own men, 
Sikatuna was prevailed upon to board the vessel and meet Legazpi. The 
Bohol chief’s actions were explained repeatedly in the account as under-
standable “because of the past atrocities suffered here at the hands of the 
Portuguese” who initially offered friendship only to pillage the community: 
“they robbed, killed and captured many of them, a total of more than eight 
hundred” (Anon. [1990], 192).
Legazpi is reported to have “felt it meant so much to get these people to 
come to us” (ibid.). Eight days after the Spaniards had anchored the meeting 
of leaders finally took place.
When Si Catuna arrived at the flagship, the General [Legazpi] received 
him graciously with all the friendship and affection he could muster. 
The principal [Si Catuna] said that he wanted to make a blood com-
pact with the General to seal their true friendship. And this was done, 
drawing from each breast two drops of blood, mixing them with wine 
in a silver cup, then dividing the contents into two cups equally, both 
drank at the same time, each of them his half of the wine-blood mix-
ture. When this was over, the principal expressed great happiness. The 
General ordered that preserves and wine from Spain be brought in. 
The principal thought that this was not bad at all.
The blood ceremony, which the report states was wanted by Sikatuna, 
first with Santiago and then with Legazpi, was conducted without discuss-
ing any terms except the arrangements for the encounter and Sikatuna’s 
desire for “true friendship.” On board the flagship the feasting that Legazpi 
ordered right after the blood oath was conformable with indigenous practices 
of ritualized food events. Immediately following the sharing of food, according 
to the account, Legazpi began to explain his purposes: his monarch had wanted 
to extend “friendship” with all the local chiefs “of these islands” who would 
become the king’s vassals; he was there to trade and barter, and he would pay 
them “very well and to their satisfaction”; he would keep discipline among his 
soldiers; and “he would always see to their well being and now that they had 
made the blood compact things would be even better from then on” (ibid.).
Legazpi reportedly took Sikatuna “for his friend and thus he loved 
him as if he were his own brother” (ibid.). Evidently, if this account can be 
trusted, Legazpi and Sikatuna would seem to have understood that they had 
solemnized a pact of blood brotherhood. Sikatuna reportedly said that “now 
that their friendship had been sealed they would come without fear” (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, Sikatuna was not entirely convinced: “Although this fear lin-
gers on, he had entered into the pact of peace and amity with the General who it 
was hoped would keep it inviolate for as long as they did not break it. Only then 
could they be sure that what they shared was true friendship” (ibid., 193). 
The conversation shifted to the state of the local economy. Sikatuna 
explained, “that year they had suffered famine on this island due to drought 
and that they did not have rice nor anything to eat, nor pigs or goats or chick-
ens” (ibid.). Whether this was an extreme portrait of the situation cannot 
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be ascertained, but Sikatuna did say he would try to secure supplies for the 
Spaniards from the island’s interior. Legazpi expressed regret for the Por-
tuguese actions and he asked Sikatuna to narrate what happened “so that 
an account of it could be given to the King of Castilla by his vassal” (ibid.). 
Legazpi stressed that Spaniards were different from Portuguese, but Sikatuna 
explained that they could not discern the difference because Portuguese and 
Spaniards “had the same gestures, arms and clothes” (ibid.). Legazpi reiter-
ated, “the natives could rest assured that the word of friendship given by his 
men or by other Castilians would be kept without hesitation nor deceit” 
(ibid). As if to further prove his sincerity, Legazpi gave Sikatuna “four yards 
of linen tablecloth, a mirror, a chamber pot, knives, scissors and necklaces” 
and Sikatuna’s men were also given necklaces—and “After this, Si Catuna 
left very happy” (ibid.). Sikatuna seemed pleased at the end of the meeting 
and, together with Sigala, subsequently assisted Legazpi and guided him to 
Cebu. However, Legazpi (1903, 208) later reported that, “although Çica-
tuna and Çigala made friendship with me, we could put no confidence in 
them; nor would they sell us anything, but only made promises.”
Taking the account at its face value, it can be deduced that Sikatuna 
desired the blood oath with Legazpi to prevent violence and ransacking, 
which could be inflicted by an armada that was initially indistinguishable 
from the forces at whose hands Sikatuna’s followers suffered some two years 
previously. Blood brotherhood appeared to be the answer, and both men 
seemed to have understood what their swearing of friendship meant. How-
ever, Sikatuna appeared to have entertained some skepticism, which prob-
ably dissipated when Legazpi gave gifts—not because Sikatuna was dazzled 
by an object like a mirror, but because Legazpi as host of the feast had treat-
ed him as an elite guest by lavishing him with valuables, as was customary 
in the ritualized feasting of the precolonial age (Junker 2000, 314–18). In 
other words, Legazpi had acted according to the decorum of the islanders in 
a ritualized feast, and Sikatuna’s status had been affirmed at the same time 
that he managed to form an alliance that could protect his polity from what 
was perceived as the predator Portuguese.
Del Pilar: Assimilation and the Pacto de Sangre
Over three centuries later, ilustrados certainly knew about the blood oath 
of Sikatuna and Legazpi, probably by reading the historical accounts from 
that period. But their social context had changed drastically from the pre-
conquest age and they seemed unable to fathom the precolonial framework 
of meaning, despite determined efforts to reconnect with the past as Rizal 
(1889/1961) exemplified in annotating Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, 
a work that appeared in late 1889. The complex world of alliance building, 
blood brotherhood, status competition, and social fluidities evidently had 
become murky to them, and it had become difficult to appreciate Sikatuna’s 
attempt to maneuver through a time that was unlike all they had known 
previously, a world that was being turned upside down by European empire 
builders.
Heavily influenced by European political notions, the ilustrados thought 
in terms of colonization, assimilation, or independence—concepts and prac-
tices that did not apply to the precolonial world. A product of their times, 
ilustrados like Del Pilar framed their reading of the blood oath in Bohol in 
1565 as the key event that commenced the process of Spanish colonization 
of the country they had come to know as Filipinas. Instead of viewing the 
blood oath as a localized event within a set of dyadic ties, Del Pilar saw it 
as a country-to-country or people-to-people agreement, even when a politi-
cal entity called the Philippines had not existed. Del Pilar (1898, 3) opens 
his tract, La Soberanía Monacal en Filipinas (Monastic Sovereignty in the 
Philippines), which first appeared in February 1889, by calling to mind the 
blood oath:
Tres siglos hace que la sangre de Legazpi y Sicatuna mezclada en una 
copa que ambos apuraron en señal de eternal amistad, solemnizó el 
juramento de fundir desde entonces en un solo ideal las aspiraciones 
de España y Filipinas.
Pero el tiempo transcurrido, sin consolidar esta fusión, han fortificado 
sólo el predominio de los conventos que convirtieron las islas en colo-
nia de explotación monacal.
Three centuries have passed since the blood of Legazpi and Sicatuna 
blended in a cup that both men consumed in a sign of eternal friend-
ship; they celebrated their oath, from then on, to unite into a single 
ideal the aspirations of Spain and the Philippines.
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But the time that has passed, without strengthening that unity, has 
only fortified the predominance of the monasteries, which have con-
verted the islands into a colony for monastic exploitation.
Reading his present into the past, Del Pilar saw Sikatuna as standing for 
all of the Philippines, as if the Bohol chief was the duly nominated author-
ity. For his part, Legazpi (rather than Santiago) represented all of Spain, not 
just the monarch he served at that time. Revealing an essentially Western 
point of view, Del Pilar conceived the blood oath of Sikatuna and Legazpi 
as a permanent political treaty: a Blood Compact. The tacit assumption was 
that both parties entered into the contract in good faith, that it was valid, 
but continuing respect for it was contingent upon Spain’s fulfillment of its 
part. There seemed no doubt that the Philippines abided by its part of the 
agreement.
Del Pilar interpreted the blood oath as the pivotal event that established 
a lasting partnership between Spain and the Philippines.10 It defined the 
ideal. The mingling of the blood of two individuals was seen as signifying con-
comitantly the fusing of the aspirations of two countries. Those aspirations, 
Del Pilar asserted in his writings, did not include the power and dominance 
of the friars, as well as their pride and prejudice, which were also implied in 
the word soberanía. 
In an article that appeared in La Solidaridad on 30 September 1889, Del 
Pilar specified what those aspirations were as he saw them. By this time lead-
ing the Propaganda Movement’s campaign for assimilation, a central plank 
of which was representation in the Cortes, Del Pilar advanced the position 
that the assimilation of the Philippines in the Spanish body politic consti-
tuted the shared aspiration in the Blood Compact. Del Pilar (1889/1996, 
380) argued against racist ideas that reduced “the Filipino race” to an inher-
ent position of inferiority because of the Filipino’s “anthropological condi-
tions” (condición antropológica). On the contrary, he asserted assimilation as 
Spain’s imperial responsibility:
Por de pronto la anexión de Filipinas á España se verificó bajo el com-
promiso de honor por parte de esta de asìmilar á los isleños á las 
condiciones de España; los diferentes juramentos, que representantes 
de esta noble é hidalga nación sellaron con el pacto de sangre, han 
caracterizado de un modo especial la colonización española, de modo 
que aconsejar la repulsión del asimilismo filipino es sencillamente 
aspirar al perjurio de España.
España no puede, no ha de ser perjura; desde sus leyes primitivas 
hasta la más modernas consagran el principio de asimilación para 
Filipinas. . . . (ibid.)
The annexation of the Philippines to Spain was effected under the hon-
orable obligation on the part of the latter to assimilate the islanders to 
the conditions of Spain. The different oaths, which representatives of this 
noble and illustrious nation sealed with the pacto de sangre, have given 
Spanish colonization a special character, such that to advise the rejection 
of the assimilation of the Filipino is simply to desire the perjury of Spain.
Spain cannot and should not perjure itself. From its primitive laws to 
the most modern, all are consecrated to the principle of assimilation 
for the Philippines. . . .
The Pacto de Sangre was depicted as giving Spanish colonialism a dis-
tinctive character, which the French would later call mission civilisatrice. It 
was Spain’s “honorable obligation” to assimilate Filipinos, in other words, to 
civilize and uplift the natives Spain had colonized. In its invasion of the Phil-
ippines, the United States would call upon its so-called manifest destiny and 
extend to its new subject people the rewards of “benevolent assimilation.” 
Del Pilar probably would not have realized the full implications of what he 
propounded as the meaning of the Pacto de Sangre, but the U.S. invasion 
did end the soberanía monacal. He insisted the Blood Compact was a legal 
contract, a treaty that justified Spain’s colonization of the Philippines. In his 
mind the blood oath of Sikatuna and Legazpi was a negotiated contractual 
exchange: Spain could annex the Philippines and in return the Philippines 
was to be assimilated. This legal contract was honored mostly in the breach 
because of friar hegemony, but it was time, Del Pilar asserted, to call Spain 
to account, lest Spain perjure itself.
Luna: Ambivalence in El Pacto de Sangre
The use of the word “pacto” and its usual English translation as “compact” has 
reinforced the interpretation of the blood oath as a legal treaty. Schumacher 
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(1973, 206; 1997, 228) suggests that the ilustrados “presented the pact as a 
contractual agreement between equals.” But how equal or unequal were the 
parties to such a supposed treaty? Even as Del Pilar, as well as Juan Luna, 
thought of the blood oath in Bohol as a pacto, there was ambivalence about 
whether the two parties could be deemed more or less at par. After all, if they 
were relatively equal, why would there be a need to assimilate the islanders? 
The position of the Philippines as “annexed territory” in need of redemp-
tive assimilation indicated it was in a subordinate position, even as Del Pilar 
argued Filipinos should not be regarded as racially inferior.
The ambivalence of the ilustrados’ interpretation of the blood oath of 
Sikatuna and Legazpi is registered in Juan Luna’s painting El Pacto de Sangre 
(fig. 2), completed in Europe in 1885, which he executed, along with another 
painting (Miguel Lopez de Legaspi), in return for the scholarship he received 
from the Ayuntamiento de Manila (Kulay Diwa 2009). This ambivalence is 
manifested in divergent readings to which the painting—exhibited in Mala-
cañang since the early twentieth century—has given rise.
Floro Quibuyen (1999, 188) sees the painting as encoding the basic 
superiority of Spain. He argues that the focus is on Legazpi, while Sikatuna 
is rendered faceless, the only islander in the scene dominated by Spanish 
conquistadors. 
There is a striking imbalance in this Rembrandt-style painting: On 
the lower left edge is seated local chieftain Sikatuna, poised against 
six Spaniards, who fill up four-fifths of the whole canvas. Five of the 
Spaniards are standing tall, two of them wearing armor. Note the 
disparity in the visual representation of the two protagonists: Light 
falls on Legazpi who faces us, the viewers, whereas Sikatuna’s back 
is turned to us, as he sits oblique to the table. The play of light and 
shadow on Legazpi’s face creates a dramatic, imposing aura. (ibid.)
Quibuyen points out that Sikatuna is seemingly “pushed out of the frame by 
Legazpi and his retinue” (ibid.). Moreover, he observes that “Legazpi seems 
relaxed, [but] Sikatuna evinces tension as he holds on to his kris (native 
sword)” (ibid.).
In contrast to Quibuyen’s interpretation, Paul Zafaralla (1986) has 
offered a nuanced but quintessentially twentieth-century nationalist read-
ing of Luna’s painting. Zafaralla (ibid., 54) claims that “The pictorial and 
analytical sweep of the canvas with its assertion of the Filipino role in a 
new world of discovery transformed the historical event into a major cul-
tural document.” He (ibid., 55) notes that Luna’s painting is “asymmetrically 
designed” but the “visual imbalance” is 
solved . . . by bringing Sikatuna close to the viewer. . . . For while 
Sikatuna leans alone, his closeness to the viewer, his large build and 
downward thrust, are enhanced by the arrangement of the heads 
which form a diagonal line swooping down Sikatuna’s helmet. This 
is further reinforced by the figures themselves whose eyes are cast 
toward the Bohol chieftain.
Zafaralla (ibid.) argues that Luna “employed a compositional trick in 
bringing about the focal point” such that Sikatuna has “primacy in the com-
position.” He adds, “The contrast in orientation (the Spaniards are frontally 
oriented; Sikatuna is not) invests Sikatuna with an aura of mystery and the 
power to make the native viewer identify with him readily” (ibid.).
Zafaralla (ibid.) underscores the “systematic culture clash” in Luna’s 
painting. “Good faith and the honor system were the qualities which Sikatuna 
Fig. 2. Juan Luna’s El Pacto de Sangre, 1885
Source: Cover of Almario 2003
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brought with him to the celebration of the kasikasi tradition: he is alone in the 
painting. Bad faith and deceit characterized Legazpi: he is amply protected 
by armed officers and men” (ibid., 55–56).11
The question, of course, in Zafaralla’s reading of Luna’s painting is this: 
If the atmosphere was one of deceit, why did Sikatuna proceed with the 
blood ceremony? Was Sikatuna’s a futile bravado?
Note that Luna’s painting was completed over three years prior to Del 
Pilar’s publication of his La Soberanía Monacal, which used the Pacto de 
Sangre as a watershed event in the conjoined histories of two countries. In 
fact, Del Pilar (1898, 3) credited Luna’s role in “rekindling the memory of 
the Pacto de Sangre”: La paleta de Luna ha revivido del pacto de sangre entre 
Legazpi y Sicatuna. However Del Pilar evidently set aside the unanswered 
questions raised by Luna’s painting: Who was really the main man in this 
event? Why was Sikatuna all by himself? What was the atmosphere dur-
ing the Pacto de Sangre? Was there deception? These questions were not 
crucial for Del Pilar, who, in his political campaign on assimilation, sought 
to wield the Pacto de Sangre to bring Spain to a position of accountabil-
ity. Nevertheless, one fundamental, though largely unarticulated, question 
seemed to have lingered. Amid the bravery of men like Sikatuna, why was 
the Philippines colonized and brought to such an abject position, as early 
Filipino nationalism saw the situation at that time? Bonifacio would provide 
the answer.
Bonifacio: The “Fall” in the Plot of Nationalist History
The linear emplotment of nationalist history that the ilustrados began to 
conceptualize for the Philippines was evident in the linear projection to the 
past. Following a common primordialist strategy, they constructed the Phil-
ippines as having existed since time immemorial such that the Philippines 
and Spain could be conceived as entering into a political treaty in the Pacto 
de Sangre in 1565. The ilustrados, however, missed a crucial element in the 
nationalist construction of the past.
As Reynaldo Ileto (1988, 132) has shown, the stages in the standard 
nationalist plot begin with a Golden Age, followed by the Fall (as in the 
Garden of Eden), after which a Dark Age ensues. The moment of recovery 
begins with the Rise of Nationalist Consciousness, which eventually leads to 
the Birth of the Nation. Rizal did his part in envisioning the pre-Hispanic past 
in his annotations of Morga (1889/1961) and his essay “On the Indolence 
of the Filipinos” (1890/1996), in the course of which he conceptualized a 
Glorious Past in which prosperity and justice reigned among “ancient Fili-
pinos” who equaled, if not were superior to, the Spaniards (cf. Aguilar 2005). 
What had not been done was to enunciate the Fall. 
Del Pilar’s portrayal of the Pacto de Sangre was a step toward conceiv-
ing the Fall, but it did not qualify as a “real” Fall because Sikatuna was not 
portrayed as committing an error of judgment (as Adam and Eve did) in 
contracting the pact. In Del Pilar’s narrative plot, only after the Pacto de 
Sangre would Spain renege on the supposed terms of the treaty, but the treaty 
itself was valid. However, Bonifacio built on the ilustrados’ Golden Age and 
finally provided an explanation for the Fall. This step he accomplished in 
the manifesto that is conventionally attributed to him, “Ang Dapat Mabatid 
ng mga Tagalog” (What the Tagalog Should Know),12 printed in the only 
issue of the Katipunan’s publication, Kalayaan, which began its clandestine 
circulation in January 1896, becoming a factor in causing a surge in the 
membership of the Katipunan (Ileto 1979, 82).
Bonifacio’s (1896/1963, 68) manifesto begins with a scene of a Golden Age, 
marked by prosperity, ease, and harmony before the coming of the Spaniards. It 
signified “the condition of wholeness of the pre-Spanish past” (ibid., 83).
 Ytong katagalugan na pinamamahalaan ng unang panahon ng 
ating tunay na mga kababayan niyaong hindi pa tumutungtong sa mga 
lupaing ito ang mga kastila ay nabubuhay sa lubos na kasaganaan, at 
kaguinhawahan. Kasundo niya ang mga kapit bayan at lalung lalo na ang 
mga taga Japon sila’y kabilihan at kapalitan ng mga kalakal malabis ang 
pagyabong ng lahat ng pinagkakakitaan, kaya’t dahil dito’y mayaman ag 
kaasalan ng lahat, bata’t matanda sampung mga babae ay marunong 
sumulat ng talagang pagsulat ating mga tagalog.
 This Katagalugan, which our true compatriots governed in olden 
times before the Kastila had set foot on this soil, was living in com-
plete abundance and a full life (kaguinhawahan).13 It was on good 
terms with nearby places (bayan), and especially with those from 
Japan; they were buying and exchanging merchandise. All means of 
livelihood were thriving immensely, and as a result everyone behaved 
with honor. Young and old, including many women, knew how to write 
in our own Tagalog script.
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The coming of Spaniards, according to the manifesto, was purportedly 
to offer friendship, but their actions were full of deceit:
 
Dumating ang mga kastila at dumulog na nakipagkaibigan. Sa mabuti 
nilang hikayat na di umano, tayo’y aakain sa lalung kagalingan at 
lalung imumulat an gating kaisipan, ang nasabing nagsisipamahala ay 
ng yaring nalamuyot sa tamis ng kanilang dila sa paghibo. Gayon man 
sila’y ipinailalim sa talagang kaugalian ng mga tagalog na sinaksihan 
at pinapagtibay ng kanilang pinagkayarian sa pamamaguitan ng isang 
panunumpa na kumuha ng kaunting dugo sa kanikanilang mga ugat, at 
yao’y inihalu’t ininom nila kapua tanda ng tunay at lubos na pagtatapat 
na di mag tataksil sa pinagkayarian. Ytoy siang tinatawag na “Pacto de 
Sangre” ng haring Sikatuna at ni Legaspi na pinaka katawan ng hari ng 
España. (ibid.)
The Kastila arrived and came to offer friendship. With their forceful 
persuasion that they would guide us toward increased betterment and 
the further awakening of our minds, the said rulers happened to be 
seduced by the sweetness of their tempting words. Nevertheless, they 
[the Kastila] were placed under the genuine custom of the Tagalog. 
What they had agreed upon was witnessed and certified by means 
of an oath, by taking a little blood from their respective veins, which 
they mixed and drank as a sign of sincere and wholehearted pledge 
not to betray their agreement. This was what was called “Pacto de 
Sangre” of King Sikatuna and Legaspi, the representative of the King 
of Spain.
In Bonifacio’s manifesto, the Spaniards were depicted as using their 
cunning to entrap, beguile, and deceive Sikatuna. Much like the serpent 
in Eden, and seemingly with no problems of translation, the Spaniards used 
sweet words that caused Sikatuna to succumb to the tempter’s snare. Mes-
merized, Sikatuna believed Legazpi’s promises of enlightenment and pros-
perity. He agreed to a compact and, like eating the forbidden fruit, this act 
constituted the Fall. The dubious agreement was thus sealed with the Pacto 
de Sangre, the Spaniards cunningly submitting themselves to the indigenous 
practice only so they could lord it over the Filipinos.14 Unlike Del Pilar’s plot, 
in Bonifacio’s narrative the betrayal occurred at the outset—in the Garden, 
so to speak. Yet in the manifesto the focus was not so much Sikatuna’s suscep-
tibility to deception (which was not confronted) but the deceitfulness of the 
Spaniards. The narrative strategy relied on the demonization of one party in 
the Blood Compact. With Bonifacio’s manifesto the contours of nationalist 
history became coherent. The events surrounding the Pacto de Sangre con-
stituted a critical juncture in the construction of the plot of Philippine his-
tory. The manifesto also sought to complete the emplotment as it was meant 
to lead directly to the Birth of the Nation. 
Rizal did not discuss the Pacto de Sangre directly, but he alluded to the 
nature of contracts in the precolonial age and at the time of conquest. When 
Morga stated that “the contracts and negotiations of the natives were con-
summately illicit,” Rizal’s (1889/1961, 304) riposte was: “So are the contracts 
of all the nations and of all peoples, and so it is and was the very spirit of the 
contracts that the first Spaniards celebrated with the Filipino chiefs . . .” In 
this regard, he came close to what would become Bonifacio’s reading of the 
Pacto de Sangre.
In the manifesto, the agreement should have been illegitimate from the 
start, given the circumstances in which it was purportedly reached. Never-
theless Bonifacio still asked what happened to the Spaniards’ promises:
 Ngayon sa lahat ng ito’y ano ang sa mga guinawa nating paggu-
gugol nakikitang kaguinhawahang ibinigay sa ating Bayan? Ano ang 
nakikita nating pagtupad sa kanilang kapangakuan na siang naging 
dahil ng ating pag gugugol! Wala kung di pawang kataksilan ang ganti 
sa ating mga pagpapala at mga pagtupad sa kanilang ipinangakung 
tayo’y lalung guiguisingin sa kagalingan ay bagkus tayong binulag, 
inihawa tayo sa kanilang hamak na asal, pinilit na sinira ang mahal 
at magandang ugali ng ating Bayan; Yminulat tayo sa isang maling 
pagsampalataya at isinadlak sa lubak ng kasamaan ang kapurihan ng 
ating Bayan; . . . (ibid.)
 Now, for all this, after all the hard work we have done [for Spain], 
what ease have we seen bestowed upon our Bayan? Do we see any-
thing that fulfills their promise, which was the reason for our sacrifices? 
Nothing but treachery is the reward for our favors and our abiding by the 
agreeement. Instead of keeping their promise to awaken us to a 
better life, they have blinded us and infected us with their debased 
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character and forcibly destroyed the valuable and beautiful customs 
of our Bayan. They reared us in a false faith, and cast the dignity of our 
Bayan into the mire of wretchedness; . . .
The people realized only much later that the Pacto de Sangre was illicit 
because they had been “blinded” and could not see their condition properly. 
The realization of Spanish treachery and of Sikatuna falling for the “sweet-
ness of their tempting words” at the outset came belatedly as the light of 
nationalism began to cast aside the Dark Age.14
Apolinario Mabini (1931, 108), in the opening remarks of his “Orde-
nanzas de la Revolución” (1898), also alluded to the Pacto de Sangre, stating 
that “Our ancestors have recognized the ancient Kings of Castile as protectors 
and allies” in a “pact sealed with blood” (un pacto sellado con sangre); it led to 
“perfect solidarity” but “from the moment we submitted to its dominion” the 
Spanish government “shamelessly violated” the agreement (cf. Majul 1960, 
314). In Mabini’s view, the Blood Compact was “perfect” (a la Del Pilar) 
for an indeterminate period, but it was shattered (after a month?) as soon as 
Spain subjugated the Filipinos. This view postulated the colonial conquest 
as illegitimate, justifying revolution. Evidently this storyline (which seemed 
redundant as the country was already in the throes of revolution) did not 
reverberate as much as Bonifacio’s, which portrayed the Blood Compact as 
null and void from the very beginning and thus had a clear notion of the 
Fall.
Bonifacio’s narrative would resonate in Zafaralla’s (1986, 53) reading of 
Luna’s El Pacto de Sangre: “Culture clash, however, was in the cup. Sikatuna 
who revered the tradition poured his honor into it. Legazpi made a mockery 
of the rite by diluting the mixture in the cup with intentions of deceit.” The 
same motif would resurface in Tadhana, although involving Tupas rather than 
Sikatuna: Tupas offering “eternal fraternity and alliance,” Legazpi brimming 
with the impudence and treachery of a conqueror (Marcos 1976, 45).
Because of the Pacto de Sangre, which resulted in banishment from 
paradise, the Dark Age came upon the Philippines. Despite the falsity of 
the agreement, Bonifacio wanted to hold the Spaniards responsible for not 
abiding by their promise. The manifesto concluded that the light of truth 
must prevail; the Tagalog must realize the sources of their misfortune and 
unite, and realize that reason dictates the justness of separating from Spain. 
To signal the genuineness of the Katipunan siblinghood in contrast to the 
counterfeit brotherhood of Sikatuna and Legazpi, the Katipunan’s member-
ship ritual involved the neophyte signing his name with his own blood.16
While hewing to Del Pilar’s script of a nondeceptive Pacto de Sangre,17 
Bernadette Abrera (1994, 93, 102; cf. 1995) has interpreted the Katipunan 
ritual as a revival of sandugo (binalikan at muling isinabuhay) but in a new 
form (nagbagong anyo). In her view, the partaking of blood was bypassed 
because the primary relationship (ang pangunahin nang ugnayan) that was 
being established in the rite was with Inang Bayan (the Motherland) and 
everyone shared the same blood and all, therefore, were siblings (Lahat ng 
nakipag-ugnayan sa Inang Bayan ay magiging magkakadugo at kung gayon, 
mga “kapatid”) (ibid., 100), apparently with no birth order. In the pursuit of 
collective “kaginhawahan,” this perspective saw the Katipunan’s putatively 
revivalist practice as part of a “cultural revolution” (rebolusyong cultural) 
that was meant to return to Filipino roots, to restore the Golden Age. The 
Pacto de Sangre, in this case, has spawned a nativist quest.
Conclusion
The late nineteenth-century views on the Pacto de Sangre of Sikatuna and 
Legazpi all averred that the Spaniards came to the Philippines to offer friend-
ship, only for them to betray it. The event in Bohol in 1565 was represented 
in a manner that explicitly advanced a political agenda—from Del Pilar’s 
assimilation to Bonifacio’s revolution—in the process constructing the plot 
of nationalist history that would seek final realization in the revolution. 
On one hand, because of Del Pilar’s specific political project, it had 
not been possible, it seems, to construe the Pacto de Sangre as a decep-
tion, for assimilation called upon the validity of an alleged agreement to 
assimilate and civilize the islanders. In the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury this view has been revived and extended in two major approaches: (a) 
a hard “assimilationist” version found in the works of, for instance, Arcilla 
and Almario; and (b) a soft “equalist” version that are of two varieties: (i) the 
official state version embodied in the Order of Sikatuna and evident in the 
writings of Ocampo; and (ii) the perspective seen in the work of Abrera. On 
the other hand, because Bonifacio’s political project was separation from 
Spain by means of revolution, he could construct the Pacto de Sangre as ille-
gitimate, which invalidated the whole of Spanish colonialism and justified 
revolution. Bonifacio’s plot line is echoed in commentaries such as those in 
Tadhana and of Zafaralla.
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As far as can be ascertained, the late nineteenth-century constructions 
of the Pacto de Sangre diverged from the ancient blood oaths as well as 
the historical event in Bohol in 1565, in which, on the one hand, Sikatuna 
sought a way of dealing with a world that was changing radically because of 
European rivalries and the Spanish intent to colonize the islands and, on the 
other hand, Legazpi sought survival and a means to effect smooth conquest. 
The complex world of small polities, networks of rulers and vassal chiefs, 
status contests, internecine warfare, and dyadic blood oaths had become 
by the late nineteenth century inaccessible to Spain’s colonial subjects, 
precisely because Spanish colonialism had intervened and transformed the 
indigenous societies. Father Schumacher had glimpsed the incongruity of 
the late nineteenth-century nationalist readings of the blood oath of Sikatu-
na and Legazpi. This article has built on that seminal insight to demonstrate 
the virtual absence of historical grounding—and thus the myth making—in 
the early Filipino nationalists’ appropriations of the blood oath in Bohol. 
At the same time, the repackaging of the blood oath depended upon the 
inspiration derived from divergent political projects, which together in their 
diversity created and bequeathed to later generations one of the founding 
myths of Filipino nationhood.
Notes
Many thanks are due to Caroline Sy Hau and Francis Gealogo for reading earlier versions of this 
paper. Francis also gave me a number of very helpful leads. Needless to say, the responsibility is 
mine alone. The photograph of Napoleon Abueva’s “Blood Compact” (fig. 1) is from the Internet, 
found at http://travel.webshots.com/photo/1375962633057910031ExZGLl, accessed on 17 May 
2010. The editorial office has sought permission for use of this photo.
1  Throughout this article the contemporary spelling of the Bohol chief’s name, Sikatuna, is used. 
However, the various spellings in cited extracts are retained. The same rule applies in the spelling 
of Legazpi’s name.
2 “Legazpi, with the aid of the Malay pilot, explained to the two kings of Bohol, Katuna (Sikatuna) 
and Gala (Sigala) that the Spaniards were not Portuguese and that they had come on a mission 
of peace not to destroy, kill, or plunder. On learning this, the Bohol kings and their people became 
friendly and welcomed the Spaniards.” “On March 16, 1565, Legazpi and Katuna performed a blood 
compact to seal their friendship in the present site of Barrio Bo-ol, Baclagon. A few days later 
Legazpi had a similar pact with Gala. In his report to Philip II, Legazpi described the ceremony 
of the blood compact in the following words: ‘It is observed in the following manner: one from 
each party draws two or three drops of blood from his own arms or breasts and mixes them in 
the same cup, with water or wine. Then the mixture must be divided equally between two cups, 
and neither person may depart until both cups are alike drained’” (Zaide 1979, 234–35). Curiously 
Zaide quoted Legazpi’s description of the blood oath, which was made specifically in relation to 
how one Spaniard, Francesco Gomez, had “disembarked to make blood-friendship with them [the 
islanders of Leyte], a ceremony that is considered inviolable,” but who was murdered: “While this 
man was about to bleed himself, one of the natives pierced his breast from one side with a lance” 
(Legazpi 1903, 201).
3  “The expedition reached Cebu in February, 1565. Later Legazpi sailed to Cibabao (Leyte) then to 
Samar. Here he concluded a blood compact with some of the chieftains. Early in March, he sailed 
to Camiguin Island, then to Butuan in Mindanaw, and then to Bohol. The scarcity of food in Bohol 
led Legazpi to order his men to sail for Cebu” (Agoncillo 1974, 39).
4 In the Pantayong Pananaw school of thought, Salazar (1997, 128–29) initially used 1565 for a 
new periodization of Philippine history, but subsequently moved the pivotal date to 1588 when 
Spain solidified its hold over the Philippines.
5 “At Legazpi’s request, the Moro agreed to invite chief Sikatuna of Bohol to see Legazpi. The chief 
hesitated, but agreed to come aboard ship as long as ransom was exchanged, and the blood 
compact was first performed. Legazpi sent a soldier who performed the ceremony with Sikatuna’s 
son, and the day after, Sikatuna came to the boat and performed the blood compact with Legazpi. 
They collected blood from their arms, and mixed it with wine in two cups which the two leaders 
drank simultaneously. Finally, on 15 April, Legazpi took possession of Bohol in the king’s name” 
(Arcilla 1991, 22–24).
6 Ocampo (1999, 11) ended his piece with a double-edged statement that was also meant to elicit 
laughter: “Luna and Rizal took great pride in pre-colonial culture unlike people today who now 
remember Legaspi and Urdaneta as upscale Makati villages while Sikatuna had been downgraded 
to a Quezon City subdivision.”
7 The Blood Compact Shrine is claimed to be located on the approximate spot where it happened, 
“on the side of the road between present-day Tagbilaran and Baclayon in Bohol,” but Ocampo 
(2009) says it “has since been proven to be on the wrong side of history, because the site of the 
Legaspi-Sikatuna blood compact was in Loay, Bohol.”
8 Excluded in this discussion is Pedro Paterno, but see Mojares 2006, 95–101.
9 Theologically the blood oath may be interpreted as prefiguring the covenant of Christ in the New 
Testament.
10 See Anon. 1891/1996 for another article in La Solidaridad that used the Pacto de Sangre as the 
great dividing line in history.
11 These ambivalences, but without the benefit of brush strokes on canvass, are reproduced in 
Abueva’s Blood Compact, which obviously has been modeled on Luna’s El Pacto de Sangre. As a 
comparison of figs. 1 and 2 shows, key aspects of the painting are found in the sculpture, such as 
a left-handed Sikatuna located on the left side of the frame, a right-handed Legazpi to Sikatuna’s 
left, and a group of Spaniards to Legazpi’s left, dominating the right side of the frame. 
12 The full text of Bonifacio’s manifesto can be found in Bonifacio 1896/1963; Richardson 2009; cf. 
Ileto 1979, 82–88.
13  The root word of kaguinhawahan (or kaginhawahan) is guinhawa or ginhawa, which connotes 
ease of life, satisfaction of needs, breathing, an essence of life. 
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14 In the nationalist construction of Indonesian history, one important question was “the cause of 
the transition from glorious past to dark present” (Reid 1979, 291). As in Bonifacio’s schema, 
Mohammad Ali found the answer in Dutch trickery: “our fall and humiliation as a colonized nation 
was a consequence of the trickery, cunning, and deception of the Dutch and their divide and rule 
policy” (cited in ibid.).
15  In her discussion of Bonifacio’s “Ang Dapat Mabatid ng mga Tagalog,” Abrera (1994, 98–99; cf. 
1995) omits all mention of deception, perhaps because it would run counter to the assertion: 
“Mahalagang ang ating pakikipag-ugnayan sa mga Kastila ay iniugat ni Bonifacio sa sandugo, 
dahil pumapasok sa kanyang kasulatan ang pag-unawa rito ng mga Pilipino bilang ugnayan 
ng magkakapantay na dapat humantong sa higit na kaginhawahan para sa isa’t isa” (It is 
important that Bonifacio rooted our relationship with the Spaniards in sandugo, because the 
Filipinos’ understanding of it as a relationship of equals that should eventuate in the heightened 
kaginhawahan of each side enters his text) (ibid., 99).
16 Although there is no corroborating evidence from other sources, Isabelo de los Reyes (1899/1993, 
35–36) made the intriguing report that marriage rites in the Katipunan were based on the Pacto de 
Sangre: “The bride and the bridegroom took blood from their arms by means of an incision made 
before a person recognized as authority and witnesses, then the blood thus taken was mixed with 
wine.” The bride drank the mixture while making an oath of fidelity and invoking a curse in case 
she did otherwise, followed by the groom whose oath did not include fidelity but simply “to carry 
the burden of my family” failing which he invoked a curse (ibid.). Was this a vestige of the ancient 
blood oath? Oddly one of the terms used for blood brothers in ancient England was “wed brothers” 
(Heather 1952, 158). Or was this Katipunan ritual, if indeed it was practiced, an attempt to redeem 
the blood oath that Legazpi supposedly tarnished in the Pacto de Sangre?
17 See note 15.
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